Family Law: The Aftermath of \u3cem\u3eCanakaris\u3c/em\u3e by Guthrie, Shirley Law
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 35 Number 3 Article 4 
5-1-1981 
Family Law: The Aftermath of Canakaris 
Shirley Law Guthrie 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
Shirley Law Guthrie, Family Law: The Aftermath of Canakaris, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 531 (1981) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol35/iss3/4 
This Developments in Florida Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami 
School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please 
contact library@law.miami.edu. 
Family Law: The Aftermath of Canakaris
SHIRLEY LAW GUTHRIE*
Cases decided by the district courts of appeal after the su-
preme court's landmark decision in Canakaris V Canakaris re-
flect its impact on marriage dissolution law in Florida. The au-
thor surveys and critically examines those subsequent cases
and concludes that legislation is necessary to establish Florida
as a true equitable distribution state and to lend consistency to
the division of property by the courts upon dissolution of
marriage.
I. INTRODUCTION ......................................................... 531
II. LUMP SUM ALIMONY .................................... ............ 536
A . F irst D istrict ..................................................... . 536
B . Second D istrict ................................................... 537
C . T hird D istrict .................................................... 540
D . F ourth D istrict ................................................... 544
E . F ifth D istrict ..................................................... 54 7
III. SPECIAL EQUITY ....................................................... 550
A . F irst D istrict ..................................................... 551
B . Second D istrict ................................................... 552
C . T h ird D istrict .................................................... 553
D . F ourth D istrict ................................................... 5 54
E . F ifth D istrict ..................................................... 555
IV . C ONCLUSION ........................................................... 555
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 31, 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
Canakaris v. Canakaris,1 a case described as an attempt "to bring
some stability to the area of law dealing with alimony and the dis-
position of property in marriage dissolution cases. ''  Before
Canakaris, Florida was one of the few remaining jurisdictions that
distributed marital property according to common law record ti-
tle." In these jurisdictions, courts award marital property to the
* Law clerk to the Honorable William M. Hoeveler, United States District Judge,
Southern District of Florida; J.D. University of Miami School of Law; Member, University
of Miami Law Review.
1. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). The Canakaris decision was filed January 31, 1980, and
clarified by revisions on March 27, 1980. The published opinion did not appear until
clarification.
2. Lewis v. Lewis, 383 So. 2d 1143, 1144 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
3. The other record title states are Mississippi, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia,
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spouse holding record title unless the other party demonstrates a
special equity giving rise to an interest in the property. A court
may grant a special equity in separately held property only on
proof that the spouse without title has contributed substantially in
funds or services to the acquisition or improvement of that prop-
erty.5 Jointly owned property, on the other hand, is subject to dis-
tribution or partition as marital property unless one spouse shows
that nonmarital funds purchased the property, and the other
spouse cannot show any intention to make a gift of half the
property.
Some states follow a community property system of distribu-
tion in which property owned before the marriage reverts to its
original owner, and property acquired during the marriage is di-
vided either equally or equitably.7 By judicial decision or by stat-
ute, however, a majority of states have adopted a system granting
the courts the discretion to provide for an equitable distribution
upon divorce.' Some of these states phrase the standard for distri-
bution simply in terms of what the court deems "just" or "equita-
ble"-amorphous terms at best.' In other equitable distribution
states, legislatures have issued guidelines that, although still al-
lowing judicial discretion, assist the courts in more definitively
framing the boundaries of an equitable distribution of marital
property.10
and West Virginia. Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview, 14 FAM. L.Q.
229, 229 (1981).
4. A special equity is a vested right to a specific piece of property created through an
"extraordinary contribution toward its acquisition, either financially or through personal in-
dustry and service to the other party." Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1976). See also 34
U. MIAMI L. REv. 1227 (1980).
5. A special equity may arise, for example, when a wife's labors nurture her husband's
separately owned business. The court may determine that although the wife does not hold
record title, she does have a special equity in the business because of her direct contribution
to it. See Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d at 7.
6. Id.
7. I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 40:1 (Supp. 1980).
8. Id.
9. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1980-1981), for example, provides in part
that:
In all actions where a judgment of divorce or divorce from bed and board is
entered the court may make such award or awards to the parties, in addition to
alimony and maintenance, to effectuate an equitable distribution of the prop-
erty, both real and personal, which was legally and beneficially acquired by them
or either of them during the marriage.
10. The statutes range in detail from those of states such as Maine, which list a few
relevant factors for the court to consider, to those of states such as New York, which give
comprehensive and almost exhaustive detail. The Maine statute, for example, advises the
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Although Florida is still a record title state, its alimony stat-
ute, section 61.08 of the Florida Statutes, lists guidelines to assist
courts in a proper determination of alimony. As amended in 1978,
the statute also provides that "[t]he court may consider any other
factor necessary to do equity and justice between the parties.""
The statute falls short of making Florida an equitable distribution
jurisdiction, however, because it fails to specify that separately
court to divide the marital assets as it deems just, after considering all relevant factors,
including:
A. The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital property,
including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker;
B. The value of the property set apart to each spouse; and
C. The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of prop-
erty is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home or the right to live therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having
custody of any children.
2. Definition. For purposes of this section only, "marital property" means all
property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
A. Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
B. Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to the marriage or
in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
C. Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
D. Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and
E. The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A(1) (1981).
The New York statute, in contrast, lists 10 factors to consider:
(1) the income and property of each party at the time of marriage, and at
the time of the commencement of the action;
(2) the duration of the marriage and the age and health of both parties;
(3) the need of a custodial parent to occupy or own the marital residence
and to use or own its household effects;
(4) the loss of inheritance and pension rights upon dissolution of the mar-
riage as of the date of dissolution;
(5) any award of maintenance under subdivision six of this part;
(6) any equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect contribution
made to the acquisition of such marital property by the party not having title,
including joint efforts or expenditures and contributions and services as a
spouse, parent, wage earner and homemaker, and to the career or career poten-
tial of the other party;
(7) the liquid or non-liquid character of all marital property;
(8) the probable future financial circumstances of each party;
(9) the impossibility or difficulty of evaluating any component asset or any
interest in a business, corporation or profession, and the economic desirability of
retaining such asset or interest intact and free from any claim or interference by
the other party;
(10) any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and
proper.
N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney Supp. 1980).
11. 1978 Fla. Laws ch. 78-339, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.08(2) (1977)). The legisla-
ture added these words to the statute in 1978 in apparent reaction to and approval of Brown
v. Brown, 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). See 34 U. MIAMI L. Rzv. 1227, 1237 (1980).
19811
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held property is available for distribution, or that courts may em-
ploy lump sum alimony to distribute marital property equitably. In
addition, the statute does not address the distinctions between
lump sum alimony to reallocate property and alimony for support.
In the past, Florida courts awarded wives permanent alimony
for their support almost as of right if the husbands could afford
it.
1
2 More recently, since the inception of no-fault divorce, courts
have de-emphasized permanent alimony, recognizing that hus-
bands and wives are "equal partners" in the marital relationship
and a wife is not absolutely entitled to a "right in her husband's
earnings for the remainder of her life."'" Instead, courts have
awarded lump sum alimony to divide marital assets fairly. For ex-
ample, in the important case of Brown v. Brown," the District
Court of Appeal, First District, held that a trial court has the dis-
cretion to use lump sum alimony as a tool to adjust the material
wealth of the parties upon dissolution of their marriage. The court
acknowledged that although one spouse may technically have
earned all the parties' assets in the marketplace, the trial court
should not denigrate the value of a homemaker's contribution to
the marriage partnership. This decision was a step forward in the
movement toward equitable distribution, but it did not define
what specific factors a court would consider other than the part-
ners' contributions to the marriage. Brown also did not distinguish
the elements of the various kinds of alimony.
Although the wife in Brown, a homemaker for eighteen years,
ostensibly needed and deserved a larger alimony award than
$17,700 when the husband had a net worth of over $200,000, the
wives in two subsequent cases apparently did not. First, in Cum-
mings v. Cummings," the trial court awarded the wife lump sum
alimony of the husband's interest in the marital home and re-
quired the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, modified the attorney's fees,
fixing them at a lower figure. The Supreme Court of Florida re-
versed, finding that "[t]he parties had been married five years and
had no children, and the wife's income was approximately equal to
that of the husband, at least during the last few years when both
12. See Welsh v. Welsh, 160 Fla. 380, 35 So. 2d 6 (1948); Phelan v. Phelan, 12 Fla. 449
(1868).
13. Beard v. Beard, 262 So. 2d 269, 272 (Fla. lst DCA 1972).
14. 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
15. 330 So. 2d 134 (Fla. 1976).
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parties were public school teachers."' Because the wife made "no
positive showing of necessity, ' 17 the court erred in awarding her
lump sum alimony. Second, in Meridith v. Meridith, 8 the Su-
preme Court of Florida reaffirmed its earlier Cummings stance by
quashing a lump sum award of the husband's interest in the mari-
tal home because the wife had made no showing of need for the
award. Neither Cummings nor Meridith discussed what other eq-
uitable factors, besides need, might control an award of lump sum
alimony.
Between 1976 and 1980, the district courts of appeal were un-
derstandably confused in their attempts to deal equitably with dis-
tributions of marital assets through lump sum awards. Some courts
continued to follow the liberal position of Brown;" some courts fol-
lowed what they perceived was the necessity requirement of Cum-
mings and Meridith.'0
Canakaris and its companion case, Duncan v. Duncan," spe-
cifically addressed the distinctions between, and the elements to
consider in awarding, the various kinds of alimony. The court may
appropriately award lump sum alimony if "the evidence reflects (1)
a justification [not need) for such lump sum payment and (2)
financial ability of the other spouse to make such payment without
substantially endangering his or her economic status."'2 Perma-
nent periodic alimony, on the other hand, turns on "the needs of
one spouse for the funds and the ability of the other spouse to
16. Id. at 135.
17. Id. at 136.
18. 366 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1978).
19. See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 345 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (permanent
periodic alimony increased to reflect a more equitable distribution); Goldman v. Goldman,
333 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (wife entitled to lump sum alimony sufficient to compen-
sate her contributions to the marriage).
20. Cornelius v. Cornelius, 382 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). Although the First Dis-
trict receded from its earlier recognition of a homemaker's contribution in Brown and
strictly followed the Cummings and Meridith need requirement, it did certify the following
question to the supreme court:
May a trial court, pursuant to Section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (1977), base an
award of lump sum alimony on factors (such as those discussed in Brown v.
Brown, 300 So.2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974)) not relating to one spouse's needs
and the ability of the other spouse to provide for those needs?
Id. at 715. The supreme court answered ths question somewhat evasively in Cornelius v.
Cornelius, 387 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 1980), by merely referring the First District to Brown and
Canakaris. See also Robinson v. Robinson, 366 So. 2d 1210 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1227 (1980).
21. 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980). Duncan was filed on the same day as Canakaris.
22. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980).
1981]
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provide the necessary funds." 8 The purpose of rehabilitative ali-
mony is "to establish the capacity for self-support of the receiving
spouse, either through the redevelopment of previous skills or pro-
vision of the training necessary to develop 'potential' supportive
skills."2  A special equity is not alimony. It is a vested right that
"will not arise when the property is acquired from funds generated
by a working spouse while the other spouse performed normal
household and child-rearing responsibilities.
'2 5
Florida courts have relied on Canakaris extensively.2 Al-
though the mandate on equitable distribution seems clear, what a
case means, of course, is largely determined by what other courts
say it means-by "what it will be made to stand for by another
later court. 27 During the first ten months following Canakaris, the
approaches of the district courts of appeal to the equitable distri-
bution problem ranged from a lingering emphasis on need to a
closer adherence to the Brown and Canakaris standards of marital
contributions as justification for lump sum alimony. The decisions
in all districts evidence a firmer grasp on the distinctions between
permanent and lump sum alimony, on the one hand, and special
equity on the other.
To help one appreciate the full extent of the impact of
Canakaris on Florida law, this article will next review how the ap-
pellate courts have interpreted Canakaris on lump sum alimony
and special equity.
II. LuMp SuM ALIMONY
Florida's five appellate districts have generally attempted to
follow the teaching of Canakaris that lump sum alimony is an ac-
ceptable device to distribute marital property fairly, regardless of
which spouse holds the record title to the property.
A. First District
At first confused about the state of Florida alimony law, 28 the
District Court of Appeal, First District, eventually adopted the
Canakaris rationale in Collinsworth v. Collinsworth.29 In that case,
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949, 952 (Fla. 1980).
26. Over 70 Florida decisions have cited Canakaris.
27. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 52 (1960).
28. See cases cited note 20 supra.
29. 386 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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the trial court awarded the wife forty-three acres, the marital
home, and household furnishings as lump sum alimony. The First
District affirmed the award, noting that it was no longer necessary
to rely only on need and ability to pay to justify an award of lump
sum alimony. The court said that the amendment to section 61.08
of the Florida Statutes in 1978 had changed the traditional equa-
tion for an award of alimony, "a creature of statute."80 The First
District clarified its opinion on petition for rehearing, finding no
reversible error in the trial court's recitation of "special equity,"
because the trial court had considered other factors that were
"proper considerations in making an award of alimony."81
B. Second District
In the following cases, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, consistently emphasized the equitable distribution aspect
of Canakaris in determining whether trial courts properly treated
awards of lump sum alimony. MacDonald v. MacDonald"2 graphi-
cally illustrates the import of Canakaris. In that case, the Second
District vacated an award of the husband's interest in the marital
home as lump sum alimony because the wife had obtained full
time employment and had made no showing of need for the lump
sum award. The court directed the trial court to grant the wife
exclusive possession of the home until the parties' children reached
majority. It also instructed the trial court to "revisit the issue of
permanent alimony since our opinion has thwarted the award of
lump sum alimony."38 The Second District reversed itself on re-
hearing, however, acknowledging that it had previously been una-
ware of Canakaris, affirming the lump sum award, and noting that
the award was consistent with the guidelines of Canakaris and
amended section 61.08.
In Perez v. Perez," the trial judge awarded the wife perma-
nent periodic alimony of $1,000 a month, lump sum alimony of the
husband's interest in the marital home, and granted the husband a
special equity in other real property held by the couple as tenants
by the entirety. The Second District reversed and remanded for
further proceedings consistent with Canakaris, decided after the
trial judge rendered judgment. The Second District disagreed with
30. Id. at 571; see 1978 Fla. Laws, ch. 78-339, § 1 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1977)).
31. 386 So. 2d at 572.
32. 382 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
33. Id.
34. 383 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
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the trial court's conclusion that the husband had a special equity
in jointly held property just because he bought it with money he
earned during the marriage."8 The court thus remanded the case to
the trial court "to conduct a further hearing on the question of
what alimony awards are appropriate in this case under the princi-
ples enunciated in Canakaris v. Canakaris."3
Stith v. Stith 7 also demonstrates the Second District's reli-
ance on Canakaris to reverse a trial court's award of lump sum
alimony. In Stith, the trial court awarded the wife a lump sum of
$240,000 payable in installments of $1,000 per month for twenty
years. The husband, who had an after-tax income of $50,000, con-
tended that the award to the wife should have been permanent
periodic alimony and not lump sum, since lump sum alimony
would not terminate on death or remarriage. On the other hand,
the wife described herself as a typical homemaker, forty-six years
old at the time of the divorce, having a college degree and a
teacher's certificate but little work experience. After twenty-three
years of marriage her total assets, including her interest in the
marital home, consisted of $50,000. Her husband's assets included
two life insurance policies, one for $215,850 payable to a trust, and
one for $25,000; his net assets totalled $140,000. Because it ap-
peared that the trial court had awarded the lump sum alimony to
provide for the wife in the event of her husband's death,"' the Sec-
ond District reversed the lump sum award and directed the trial
court to award permanent periodic alimony of $1,000 per month
and a lump sum award of the two life insurance policies. The life
insurance policies, however, would revert to the husband or his
designee if the wife died or remarried. The Second District indi-
cated its discomfort with the size of the trial court's award stating,
"[a] lump sum award of $240,000 to the wife on the facts in this
case simply cannot be justified as an equitable distribution of
property acquired during the marriage."" The Second District
thus permitted the husband to maintain his financial position and
denied his wife the right to divest him of his net assets.'0
35. The court declared, however, that there could be a constructive trust of the wife's
interest in favor of the husband. Id. at 253.
36. Id.
37. 384 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
38. The trial court secured the $240,000 award by having the husband name the wife as
irrevocable beneficiary of the revocable trust to which the large policy was payable, and
having him maintain a separate $25,000 policy payable to the wife. Id. at 318.
39. Id. at 320.
40. The court apparently did not consider that the lump sum award was payable over a
[Vol. 35:531
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Yet in Bullard v. Bullard41 the same court reversed a final
judgment that permitted the husband, a doctor, to retain most of
the assets he had accumulated in his name during the marriage.
The court said that the trial court had made its awards before the
Supreme Court of Florida decided Canakaris, a case that
approved and adopted a new philosophic concept for this
state-that a wife who labors at home while her husband pur-
sues material gain is a contributing partner in property acquired
during the marriage, and can be equitably compensated by
awarding her certain assets as lump sum alimony when the part-
nership is dissolved."
The Second District briefly noted the similarity of the facts in this
case to Canakaris: a lengthy marriage of a doctor to a wife "who
worked, helped him through medical school, assisted in his early
practice and then turned full time attention to home and family."'
For some unstated reason, this housewife was more deserving of a
lump sum award than the wife in Stith.
The Second District case that exemplifies court-achieved equi-
table distribution is Neff v. Neff." In Neff, the wife worked in long
hours every day, in addition to her household tasks, to help her
husband build a successful chain of restaurants. The trial court de-
nied her a special equity in the business, awarded her $800 per
month permanent periodic alimony, and lump sum alimony of the
marital home and another parcel of real estate. The Second Dis-
trict reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Canakaris, stating that Canakaris and Duncan
marked the dawn of a new era for a Florida wife who has la-
bored beside her husband in achieving material goals....
Canakaris confirms the fact that marriage may indeed be a
partnership in the economic area and that each partner is enti-
tled to a fair share of the fruits of their combined industry,
whether performed in the office, the factory, the fields or the
home."
The essence of the court's opinion was that Mrs. Neff deserved an
equitable share of the business she had helped create, no matter
20-year period and thus would not have affected the husband's assets any more than would
permanent periodic alimony.
41. 385 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
42. Id. at 1121.
43. Id.
44. 386 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
45. Id. at 319.
19811
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whether that share came from her special equity or a lump sum
award."
C. Third District
Although the District Court of Appeal, Third District, has not
articulated as consistent an interpretation of Canakaris as has the
Second District, equity is the underlying theme in most recent
Third District opinions. For example, in two recent cases, the
Third District reversed alimony awards, including lump sum
awards, because the husband could not afford them. First, Blum v.
Blum4 7 held that the trial court had abused its discretion when it
ordered the husband to pay alimony and.support of over $4,000 a
month. In that case, the husband was an osteopathic physician
earning approximately $4,200 a month, after taxes. His net assets
consisted of his half-interest in the townhouse owned by the
couple. He owned a 1976 four-door Mercedes, titled in joint names
and driven by his wife. He drove a two-door Mercedes, titled in his
wife's name only. The Third District noted that if the husband
complied with the final judgment, he would be left "with next to
nothing-about $50 a week-to live on himself, without discharg-
ing any of his other responsibilities and obligations."' "4 In addition,
since the final judgment had awarded the wife the four-door Mer-
cedes and did not award the husband the two-door Mercedes, Dr.
Blum would have been without a car to drive." Accordingly, the
Third District reversed the alimony and support awards, with in-
structions that the trial court reduce them. The Third District also
awarded the husband the two-door Mercedes as lump sum ali-
mony, acknowledging that "[w]hile it was appropriate . . . to
award the four-door car to Mrs. Blum, it was entirely unfair and
inequitable to decline reciprocally to grant to Dr. Blum the wife's
two-door, which he was driving."' 0
Second, in Parham v. Parham,51 the Third District reviewed a
46. The court found that above and beyond normal marital duties, Mrs. Neff had con-
tributed her bookkeeping services to her husband's business. The court said that her contri-
bution could have been rewarded by the use of lump sum alimony without the need for
tracing her services directly to each restaurant in the chain, as would be required under
special equity principles. Id. at 319.
47. 382 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
48. Id. at 55.
49. Id. n.5.
50. Id. at 55. The decision, in effect, awarded reciprocal lump sum alimony: one car to
the wife, and the other to the husband.
51. 385 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
[Vol. 35:531
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trial court's alimony provisions as a whole and found them want-
ing. In Parham, the husband appealed a final judgment requiring
him to pay $650 a month permanent periodic alimony, which
would survive his death as a charge on his estate, and awarding his
one-half interest in the marital home to his wife. His liabilities ex-
ceeded his assets, and his earnings as a dental. technician
amounted to $448 a week. The wife, who was in good health, had
assets totalling over $15,000, and she intended to seek employ-
ment. The Third District found that the award to the wife of the
husband's interest in the marital home would reduce his "modicum
of financial well-being ... to financial misfortune."'52 Since this re-
sult would not be consistent with Canakaris, the court reversed
the lump sum award, requesting that the trial court grant the
wife's request for partition. The Third District remanded the per-
manent alimony issue to the trial court for adjustment of the size
of the alimony payment and deletion of the part of the final judg-
ment that made the permanent alimony a charge against the hus-
band's estate.
Cuevas v. Cuevas5s is an interesting example of the Third Dis-
trict's deference to a trial court's use of lump sum alimony to at-
tain equitable distribution. Cuevas concerned the breakup of a
marriage of sixteen years between a housewife and a co-owner of a
cabinet company. At the time of the dissolution the housewife was
fifty-five and had been working as a barmaid for a year. She admit-
ted earning $3,200 a year, plus tips. Her future earning capacity
was limited by her lack of skills and a physical condition that pre-
vented her from standing for long periods of time. The husband,
on the other hand, owned fifty percent of a business worth approx-
imately $300,000 and earned $290 a week. He also received an an-
nual bonus of $1,200. The trial court awarded the wife $100 a week
in permanent alimony, the jointly owned marital home, and Geor-
gia real property titled only in the husband's name. Because the
trial court did not explain its reasons for the lump sum awards, the
Third District inferred "that the trial judge awarded the husband's
interest as lump sum alimony to ensure an equitable distribution
of property acquired during the marriage."" The award was
proper, in light of Canakaris, since "the wife had no separate prop-
erty, assets or savings of her own and the husband had the ability
52. Id. at 109.
53. 381 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
54. Id. at 732.
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to make such a conveyance without substantially endangering his
economic status.'
5
Similarly, in Epstein v. Epstein,51 the Third District upheld a
rather generous lump sum award to the wife. In that case, the
court concluded that, under Canakaris, the awards of installments
due on the sale of a franchise and the husband's interest in the
marital home, "although admittedly on the high side, ' 7 were
within the discretion of the trial court based on the "substantial
competent evidence in this record."5 8
In two recent cases, the Third District did not defer to the
trial judge's discretion and reversed lump sum awards without re-
ferring to Canakaris in the first case, and by expressly following
the principles of Canakaris in the second. In Weiner v. Weiner,"9
the court reversed an award to the wife of valuable artifacts that
were part of the household funishings. The court stated that the
record disclosed no agreement of the parties, no explicit lump sum
award, no special equity, and no request for partition. Since these
were the only means by which a court could dispose of property on
dissolution of marriage, the award was improper.60 The dissent dis-
agreed and relied on Canakaris for the proposition that the award
was "sustainable as lump sum alimony to assure an equitable dis-
tribution of property acquired during the marriage."" The dissent
also disagreed with the Third District's increase of permanent ali-
mony from $750 a week to $1,200 a week and suggested that the
wife was a woman of considerable wealth." Thus, although the
court did not infer a lump sum award here, as it did in Cuevas,
perhaps it chose not to do so because it viewed such an award as
inequitable.
In the second case, Rosen v. Rosen,6' the court affirmed the
trial court's award of the parties' marital home as lump sum ali-
mony to the wife but reversed a grant to her of $125,000 in cash.
Since the cash award derived from the husband's personal funds,
55. Id.
56. 386 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
57. Id. at 1201.
58. Id.
59. 386 So. 2d 1251 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
60. Id. at 1253.
61. Id. at 1253-54.
62. The trial court had awarded the wife a quarter of a million shares of stock in her
husband's company as a special equity. Id. at 1254 (Nesbitt, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
63. 386 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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not acquired during the marriage, the cash award was inappropri-
ate under the rationale of Canakaris. In the court's analysis, per-
manent periodic alimony is still generally preferable to lump sum
alimony, as the Supreme Court of Florida stated in Yandell v.
Yandell, " and lump sum alimony is advisable only in special cir-
cumstances-the "special equities" of Yandell.65 The Rosen court
acknowledged, however, that although Canakaris disapproved of
the term special equity in the context of lump sum alimony, it
"very significantly expanded the range of circumstances under
which lump sum may be justified, either instead of, or in addition
to, a periodic provision."" Applying the Canakaris standards to
Rosen, the court concluded that the husband had the ability to
pay, but even though the award of his interest in the marital home
was justified, "[t]here is no cognizable 'justification'-that is to
say, no 'good reason' or useful purpose"67 -for the cash award, es-
pecially since the husband inherited his liquid assets from his fam-
ily. Thus, the Brown v. Brown" standards did not apply, nor did
such possible justifications as the parties' desire to avoid unpleas-
ant future contact, the wife's need for security against the hus-
band's death, the husband's inability to make periodic payments,
or the wife's need for. a cash award.69 In remanding the award for
alteration from lump sum to periodic alimony, the court noted that
periodic alimony may be modified, and that "[bly successfully
challenging the lump sum award, [the husband] has taken the
chance that any such modification may be upward. '70
In Archibald v. Archibald7 11 however, there was sufficient jus-
tification for a lump sum award of $50,000. The Third District af-
firmed that award and an award of $750 per month in permanent
alimony. It also upheld the trial judge's refusal to grant the wife a
special equity in the husband's Jamaican hotel. The trial court had
found that the husband had acquired this hotel without using any
marital funds72 and that the wife had received half the proceeds
64. 39 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1949).
65. Id. at 556-57. The Supreme Court of Florida said in Yandell that lump sum ali-
mony is desirable only when the husband can pay the award without jeopardy to his busi-
ness or livelihood, and when other considerations, such as the wife's assistance in accumu-
lating marital property, warrant the award.
66. 386 So. 2d at 1271.
67. Id.
68. 300 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974).
69. 386 So. 2d at 1272.
70. Id. n.8.
71. 390 So. 2d 1213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
72. In fact, the husband bought the hotel in question with no cash investment. Id. at
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from the sale of another Jamaican hotel before the couple's separa-
tion. Combining two theories enunciated in Canakaris-the equi-
table distribution theory and the discretionary review theory-the
Third District concluded that the trial judge was "in the best posi-




Just as the Third District in Rosen mentioned the wife's need
as one factor to consider in awarding lump sum alimony, the re-
quirement for a positive showing of need initially persisted in the
District Court of Appeal, Fourth District. For example, in Costich
v. Costich, the Fourth District affirmed a lump sum award of the
marital home to the wife, a schoolteacher earning $250 weekly. The
court noted that the husband earned $16,500 annually as the oper-
ator of a gasoline station and received $6,590 in dividends from
stock valued at approximately $85,000. In addition, the husband
owned a business with a book value of $41,000.
The court stated that
In any determination to award alimony, regardless of its
character, there must be demonstrated a need on the part of the
recipient spouse as well as the ability of the other spouse to sat-
isfy that need. Once this need and ability have been established
the court must next consider the type of alimony most appropri-
ate under the circumstances of each case.
78
The court added, however, that in determining whether to award
lump sum alimony, a court must apply the standards of Canakaris,
justification and financial ability to pay. Because the trial court's
award of the marital home was "both equitable and just,"76 the
Fourth District affirmed the award. From this opinion it was not
clear whether the Fourth District had implicitly subjected lump
sum alimony awards to four standards: need, ability to meet the
need, justification, and financial ability to maintain economic
position.
In a second opinion filed on the same day, Lewis v. Lewis,7
1214.
73. Id.
74. 383 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
75. Id. at 1143.
76. Id.
77. 383 So. 2d 1143 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
[Vol. 35:531
FAMILY LAW
however, the Fourth District remarked that "the requirement that
there be some positive necessity to justify such an award would no
longer seem applicable. 7 s The court indicated some doubt that the
supreme court in Canakaris had expressly receded from its posi-
tion in Cummings and Meridith. The court emphasized that, in
any event, under either a liberal or a conservative interpretation of
Canakaris, the lump sum award of property to the wife was within
the trial court's discretion. The court found that the wife, a part-
time teacher earning $154 every two weeks, had a positive need for
the award; the husband, although lacking the ability to make peri-
odic payments on his income of $214 a week, could meet the wife's
need through the lump sum grant. Under the more liberal inter-
pretation of Canakaris, "a view we believe more nearly reflects the
rationale of the decision," 7' the court found the award equitable
and just. Although a trial court does not have "unbridled discre-
tion," there was "logic and justification for the result so that the
trial judge's exercise of his discretion passes the test."' 0 The test is
apparently whether the trial court acted reasonably when it
awarded lump sum alimony.'1 From the tone of these two opinions,
one can conclude that, at least at first, there was still uncertainty
in the Fourth District, and that the supreme court had not entirely
succeeded in its attempt "to bring some stability to the area of law
dealing with alimony and the disposition of property in marriage
dissolution cases."' 2
In later cases, the Fourth District dropped the language of
need and instead adopted a "reasonableness" test, blending the
Canakaris theories of justification and the reasonable discretion of
a trial judge. The Fourth District test centers on a finding of justi-
fication that is not unreasonable. In Bird v. Bird,s" for example,
the Fourth District acknowledged that although the trial court
erred by employing the confusing term "special equity" in connec-
tion with lump sum alimony, there was justification for the lump
sum award in the husband's harassment of and violence toward the
wife. The award was "not unreasonable," and it "ensure[d] equity
78. Id. at 1145.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The Fourth District, in this and other early opinions interpreting Canakaris, em-
phasized the reasonable bounds of a trial court's discretion. Such discretion is reasonable,
according to Canakaris, "[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the action
taken by the trial court. . . ." 382 So. 2d at 1203.
82. 383 So. 2d at 1144.
83. 385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
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and justice between the parties.""
Similarly, in Nusbaum v. Nusbaum,85 the court applied its
reasonableness test to a lump sum award of $125,000 in cash. The
court concluded that the grant was justified under Canakaris, and
that the husband was able to pay the sum. Moreover, the trial
court's action was not "arbitrary, fanciful or unreasonable" e in at-
tempting to ensure equity and justice between the parties.
Two recent cases in the Fourth District demonstrate the per-
missible extent of a trial court's reasonable discretion. In Gaster v.
Gaster,87 the trial court awarded permanent alimony to the wife in
a twenty-year marriage, but refused to grant her request for the
marital home as lump sum alimony. The wife and husband were
both forty-four at the time of the dissolution; their financial posi-
tions were far apart. The husband, a stockbroker, earned in excess
of $100,000 a year while the wife had been a homemaker for eigh-
teen years. The husband's net worth varied between $150,000 and
$250,000. The wife, who was disabled because of a back problem,
apparently had no assets but her half-interest in the jointly owned
marital home. The Fourth District affirmed the permanent ali-
mony award and the refusal to grant lump sum alimony. The court
stated that Canakaris "would seem to authorize, under appropri-
ate circumstances, an award of lump sum alimony to ensure an eq-
uitable distribution of property acquired during the marriage.""
The discretion of a trial court, however, defines the limits of an
equitable distribution. "Having tested that exercise of discretion
by application of the Canakaris 'reasonable man' inquiry and find-
ing that reasonable men could disagree, our authority to deal with
that aspect of the judgment is exhausted."' 9
The Gaster decision raised the question of how unreasonable a
trial court must be before the Fourth District will reverse.90 Gerber
84. Id. at 1092 (quoting Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1200).
85. 386 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
86. Id. at 1295.
87. 391 So. 2d 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (on rehearing).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 687-88.
90. In a number of cases following Canakari, the Fourth District simply affirmed lump
sum awards according to the standards delineated in the case. See, e.g., Bashaw v. Bashaw,
382 So. 2d 1352 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Hays v. Hays, 384 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980);
Liefer v. Liefer, 384 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). The court in Bashaw, for example,
indicated that under former supreme court cases the award of real estate would have been
erroneous, but "the Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, appears to have approved the
trial Judge's course of conduct in this case." 382 So. 2d at 1353.
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v. Gerber answered that question. In that case, a wife who had
never worked and had only a high school education received $30 a
week in rehabilitative alimony in addition to child support, but no
lump sum alimony. She was expected to pay all expenses on the
marital home. When the home was sold she would receive half the
proceeds from the sale of the house and a credit for the mortgage
payments representing principal. The husband, on the other hand,
owned a business producing an annual net taxable income of
$17,000. Over the years, his business corporation had paid a num-
ber of the couple's expenses directly, and "[t]hese economic bene-
fits were not reflected on the tax returns."" The Fourth District
reversed the final judgment in its entirety, holding, in part, that
the alimony award was inadequate and should have been perma-
nent instead of rehabilitative. "The financial aspects of the judg-
ment appealed from demonstrate an abuse of discretion in failing
to provide for even minimal sustenance to the wife and three mi-
nor children." 9 Given the vast difference between the husband's
resources and the wife's award, the trial court had not done equity
and justice.
E. Fifth District
The terms equity and justice figure prominently in the inter-
pretation of Canakaris given by the District Court of Appeal, Fifth
District. In Baker v. Baker," for example, the Fifth District stated
that "[i]n granting lump sum alimony the trial court should be
guided by all relevant circumstances to ensure equity and justice
between the parties as that principle is set forth in Canakaris v.
Canakaris."5 In Baker, the court reversed a lump sum award of
real property to the wife, because the award was excessive.
We are of the opinion that an award of lump sum alimony
that leaves the husband virtually without anything and creates
an instant estate of the value of in excess of $100,000.00 in the
wife was an abuse of discretion, particularly where the needs of
the wife would be more properly provided for through an award
of permanent periodic alimony."
91. 392 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
92. Id. at 318.
93. Id. at 319.
94. 388 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
95. Id. at 234.
96. Id.
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in Cowan v. Cowan,97 the Fifth District relied extensively on
Canakaris for its equitable distribution standard. That case in-
volved the dissolution of a thirty-seven-year union between a sixty-
eight-year-old retired army general and his fifty-eight-year-old
wife. The wife had a degree in business administration but had not
worked since 1944. She had contributed approximately $40,000 to
the marriage from sources independent of the marriage relation-
ship. The husband, at the time of the dissolution, had a gross an-
nual income of $71,340. The trial court awarded the wife $270 a
week in permanent periodic alimony and denied the wife lump
sum alimony of the husband's interest in the marital home. The
Fifth District reversed the. denial of lump sum alimony,. stating
that "General Cowan's business or employment will not be affected
to any extent by an award of his equity in the house to his Wife.""
To do equity and justice, the trial court should have awarded lump
sum alimony. The Fifth District also remanded the permanent ali-
mony award for reconsideration based on Canakaris. The court
pointed out that the wife had to live on $270 a week while the
husband received $1,170 a week, after alimony expenses. Although
the trial court on remand need not ensure equality in the financial
positions of the parties, it should reduce the disparity in positions,
so that "neither spouse [would pass] automatically from prosperity
to misfortune.""
Similarly, in Kirchman v. Kirchman,00 the Fifth District de-
scribed lump sum alimony as a kind of alimony "used to balance
assets acquired during the marriage between the parties."101 Al-
though it appeared that the trial court had attempted "to do eq-
uity between the parties to give the wife a portion of the husband's
assets,"' 02 the court had failed. The Fifth District disagreed with
the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding periodic ali-
mony. The wife had requested a special equity in the capital stock
of her husband's business. Instead of granting lump sum alimony
to apportion the stock, which he had acquired during the marriage,
the trial court "awarded alimony from the husband to the wife in
the amount of $2,500.00 per month for six months; $2,000.00 for
the next thirty months; $1,500.00 for the next twenty-four months
97. 389 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
98. Id. at 1188.
99. Id. at 1189 (quoting Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204).
100. 389 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
101. Id. at 330.
102. Id. at 329.
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and $600.00 for the next one hundred eighty months." 03 The trial
court did not specify the kind of alimony awarded. After examin-
ing the record, the Fifth District concluded that the award could
not be permanent alimony "because that kind of alimony contin-
ues throughout the unremarried life of the recipient"' ' unless ter-
minated by the recipient's lack of need or the donor's inability to
pay. The award was not rehabilitative alimony, "because there is
no specific finding by the trial court regarding the need for rehabil-
itation or a plan to do so."'" Rather, the award was like lump sum
alimony, but there was no indication from the record that the trial
judge intended to grant lump sum alimony equivalent to the de-
sired special equity in the stock. The court remanded the case
for entry of a proper judgment dealing specifically with the is-
sues of alimony and special equity in the shares of stock. Should
the evidence support it and the trial judge in his sound discre-
tion deems it proper, a distribution of the assets of the parties
can be effected through the use of lump-sum alimony paid
periodically.'0 6
The court did, however, affirm the portion of the final judgment
awarding to the wife the husband's interest in the marital home.
The tenor of decisions such as Kirchman is that the Fifth Dis-
trict, like Florida's other district courts of appeal, adheres to the
equitable distribution concept of Canakaris. These decisions in-
struct trial courts that they may, in their discretion, use lump sum
alimony rather than special equity to divide marital assets fairly.
Across Florida's five districts, the appellate courts pay great defer-
ence to the reasonable discretion of the trial judge. Such deference,
however, can lead to seemingly inconsistent results. In one case a
spouse may receive only rehabilitative alimony; 10 in another case
with similar facts, a spouse may receive not only permanent ali-
mony, but possibly lump sum alimony also.' °8 Even assuming that
Florida has become an equitable distribution state by judicial fiat,
inconsistencies such as these must reoccur, in the absence of legis-
lative guidelines.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 330.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 331.
107. See, e.g., Capps v. Capps, 392 So. 2d 581 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (Pearson, J.,
dissenting).
108. See, e.g., Colucci v. Colucci, 392 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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III. SPEciAL EQUITY
Although there remains some inconsistency among the dis-
tricts on what standards the courts should apply in granting lump
sum alimony, Canakaris has resoved most of the confusion con-
cerning the proper use of the term special equity. Before
Canakaris, Florida courts had used special equity loosely to justify
"both (1) a nonalimony property interest, and (2) an award of
lump sum alimony."' 0 As a nonalimony property interest, the
term described "a vested interest in property brought into the
marriage or acquired during the marriage because of contribution
of services or funds over and above normal marital duties." 110 In
this context, special equity allows a spouse to claim a vested inter-
est in property that is held by the other spouse, if he or she has
contributed funds or services beyond the usual marital duties and
if these funds or services materially contributed to the property's
acquisition."' The concept developed in case law becaqse Florida's
former alimony statute absolutely denied alimony to an adulterous
wife." 2 A court might thus grant her the equivalent of her special
equity in property despite her adultery. The statutory prohibition
against alimony to an adulteress no longer exists. The judicially
created term special equity still properly describes a vested prop-
erty interest, but Canakaris and Duncan insist that alimony is not
a vested property interest.""
Florida courts have confused the special equity that is a
nonalimony property interest with the concept of special equities
introduced in Yandell v. Yandell" 4 in the context of lump sum
awards. Canakaris noted, however, that the special equities of
Yandell concern only a case's general equities. 1"5 Following
Canakaris, "[tihe term 'special equity' should not be used when
considering lump sum alimony; rather, it should be used only when
109. Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Fla. 1980).
110. Id.
111. Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5, 7 (Fla. 1976). The courts have distributed jointly held
property equally between the spouses, unless one demonstrated a special equity in the prop-
erty. A spouse who could show a special equity could receive the entire property unless
contradictory evidence indicated that that spouse intended to make a gift of half the
property.
112. Heath v. Heath, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796 (1932).
113. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1201; Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952.
114. 39 So. 2d 554, 556-57 (Fla. 1949). Although the exact source of the confusion is
indeterminable, the supreme court's discussion of "special equity" in Heath's alimony set-
ting, 103 Fla. 1071, 138 So. 796, certainly contributed to the blending of the term with
Yandell's "special equities" in the context of lump sum alimony. See note 65 supra.
115. 382 So. 2d at 1201.
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analyzing a vested property interest of a spouse." '116
In Ingram v. Ingram,117 decided the same day as Canakaris
and Duncan, the Supreme Court of Florida confirmed the appro-
priate use of the concept of special equity. In that case, the hus-
band claimed a special equity in the marital home because he had
contributed more to the mortgage payments than his wife and had
paid for "various repairs and improvements to the home."" 8 The
wife, however, had purchased the home with a $200 down payment
ten months before the couple's marriage, and title remained in her
name alone. The trial court refused to grant the husband a special
equity. The District Court of Appeal, First District, reversed, hold-
ing that the husband's contributions constituted a special equity
and remanded the case to the trial court for a determination of the
extent of the husband's interest in the home. The supreme court
found no special equity as defined by Canakaris but stated that
the trial judge had discretion to award the husband alimony if nec-
essary "to do equity between the parties."11 9
A. First District
The same court that had mistaken special equity for lump
sum alimony in Ingram correctly applied the Canakaris and
Duncan definition in Hebert v. Hebert.120 In that case, the First
District affirmed the trial court's refusal to grant the wife a special
equity in the jointly held marital home of more than her contribu-
tion from separate funds toward its purchase -price. The court
noted that although she had contributed originally more than half
of the purchase price, her husband later repaid her the excess of
her contribution over one-half, so that each would have an equal
investment in the house. In Beugnet v. Beugnet,12 1 on the other
hand, the First District affirmed a trial court's award of special eq-
uity in a bar business to a wife. There, the wife had worked in her
husband's bar business for thirteen years, and the bar license was
held in joint names. The First District found that "the record sup-
ports the reasonableness and propriety of the trial court's exercise
of its discretion in ruling that appellee's contributions established
116. Id.
117. 379 So. 2d 955 (Fla. 1980).
118. Id. at 956.
119. Id.
120. 382 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
121. 383 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).
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her special equity and joint ownership of the bar." '122
B. Second District
The wife in Holley v. Holley,125 however, was not successful in
establishing a special equity in her husband's law practice. In Hol-
ley, both husband and wife were attorneys in their fifties and had
been married for only six years. The wife assisted her husband in
an unsuccessful judicial campaign, worked for a short time as his
secretary, and assisted him in his authorship of a book. She argued
that she had a special equity in his practice for these reasons and
because she had allowed her husband to practice in a commercial
building she had owned before the marriage. The District Court of
Appeal, Second District, however, was not convinced that the wife
had contributed substantially to her husband's practice. She had
retained ownership of the building and the husband had paid all
the mortgage payments and other expenses during his occupancy.
The court was unpersuaded that "the services provided by the wife
were 'made over and above the performance of normal marital
duties.' ,,1"4
Similarly, in Hoch v. Hoch,155 the Second District, held im-
proper a trial court's award to the wife of a special equity of $7,000
more than her half-interest in the parties' homes. In' Hoch, the
wife's contribution was connected with the marital relationship, al-
though her earnings during the marriage had paid for the property
while her husband's earnings had contributed to the family's sup-
port. " The court noted that Ball v. Ball127 had held that a spouse
could create a special equity by an unrebutted showing that he or
she had supplied all the consideration for the property from a
source clearly unconnected with the marital relationship. In Smith
122. Id. at 1188.
123. 380 So. 2d 1098 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
124. Id. at 1100 (quoting Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 956). The court agreed with
the trial judge's conclusion that the wife's expenses in resuming her law practice after four
years would be no more than the husband's expenses of relocating his home and his office,
and that therefore she was not entitled to alimony. Id.
125. 380 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980). The Hoch court relied on the Duncan holding
that a special equity does not arise when a couple acquires property with funds that one
spouse earned during marriage while the other performed normal marital or household du-
ties. Id. at 500.
126. The court somewhat softened its holding on special equity by remanding the case
to the trial judge to allocate the marital assets fairly, implying that lump sum alimony
might be appropriate since the wife had purchased the couple's first home with independent
funds. 380 So. 2d at 500.
127. 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976).
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v. Smith,128 the Second District concluded that the husband had
failed to make such an unrebutted showing to justify a special eq-
uity in property held as tenants by the entirety. In that case, the
husband was an attorney earning $61,500 a year, with net assets of
approximately $2,000,000. His wife, a former stewardess, was a
housewife and mother to the couple's three children. The husband
contended that he had used inherited money to purchase three
parcels of real estate. The wife argued that they had purchased the
property for the family's use and that the $250,000 inherited from
a friend of the family had been meant for the couple jointly.1
29
They did not contest that they had taken title to the property in
joint names. The court concluded that "[t]he refusal of the trial
court to find a special equity in the husband. . . thereby leaving
the parties as joint owners of the three parcels of property is sup-
ported by the facts established in this case ....
Although the trial court improperly used the term special eq-
uity to award a spouse marital property in McCall v. McCall,181
the Second District upheld the award as lump sum alimony. Since
the trial court could have properly granted the wife the marital
home, the Second District let the award stand "as an appropriate
lump sum alimony award although erroneously designated as a
'special equity.' ,,182
C. Third District
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has distin-
guished special equity from lump sum alimony with the same care
and consistency as the First and Second Districts. For example, in
Bullard v. Bullard,'8 the Third District held that a wife had no
special equity in the marital home, furniture, and cemetery lots
owned by the couple, merely because her financial contributions
exceeded her husband's. The parties purchased these properties
with their earnings during the marriage. The Third District ruled,
however, that the wife had a trust in some real property that her
aunt intended to convey only to her. Her husband had agreed to
secure the deeds from the wife's aunt and to put the deeds in his
128. 382 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
129. The wife testified that the donor had informed both parties that she would mail
them a copy of her will and that the money was for them both. Id. at 1244.
130. Id. at 1245.
131. 386 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
132. Id. at 276.
133. 380 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980).
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wife's name alone. He breached that agreement by having the
deeds executed in both names. He also broke his subsequent
promises to tranfer title to his wife. Although that property was
also jointly held, the trial court should have awarded it to the wife
because of "[t]he additional showing. . . that Mr. Bullard agreed
to act on behalf of his wife in transferring the title solely to her,
and that he breached promises, made both before and after the
aunt's conveyance, to effect that transfer.
1 384
D. Fourth District
Employing the same reasoning as the Third District, in Hol-
brook v. Holbrook'85 the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
denied the wife a special equity in real properties owned jointly by
the couple because, although the wife was the primary source of
the purchase money, her money was connected with the marital
relationship. In that case, the wife's earnings were larger than her
husband's, and the couple had made most of the acquisitions with
her income. During the marriage, she managed the couple's
finances. None of these facts, however, were sufficient to dissociate
her contributions from the marriage. The wife in Bird v. Bird,""
however, did contribute services sufficient to justify a special eq-
uity in her husband's taxi business. 8 7 The Fourth District affirmed
the trial court's award of the wife's special equity in the business
to the husband and its award of the husband's interest in three
pieces of property to the wife. Emphasizing that a court has broad
discretion to achieve equitable distribution, the Fourth District
held that although the trial court had erroneously called the award
to the wife a "special equity," the award was appropriate as lump
sum alimony.138
134. Id. at 1092. Since the wife clearly did not intend to give half the property to the
husband, the court could have found that she had a special equity in the property. See
Duncan, 379 So. 2d at 952; Ball, 335 So. 2d at 7.
135. 383 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
136. 385 So. 2d 1090 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
137. The court noted that the wife had spent a "considerable time working in the busi-
ness." Id. at 1091.
138. The court concluded that under the circumstances of the case, the wife deserved
the lump sum award. The husband had harassed her, threatened her with a gun, shot at her,
and broken into her house. Id. at 1092. These factors sound more like the "special equities"
of Yandell than like the "justification" of Canakaris. The court should have pointed out
that the lump sum award was merely equitable compensation to the wife, since the trial




Following the same guidelines, the District Court of Appeal,
Fifth District, held in Connor v. Connor'3 9 that a wife who had
supported her mentally ill husband was not entitled to a special
equity in the marital home. According to the court, "[t]he illness
and misfortune of a spouse should not create a special equity for
the healthy spouse in jointly-owned property. 1 4 0
IV. CONCLUSION
The Canakaris decision made significant progress toward clar-
ifying the distinction between lump sum alimony and special eq-
uity. The opinion failed, however, to clarify how different kinds of
periodic alimony affect the general rule that the recipient spouse's
subsequent remarriage terminates permanent periodic alimony. In
Frye v. Frye, 1 for example, the District Court of Appeal, Second
District, demonstrated its confusion about whether rehabilitative
alimony terminates on remarriage. The court pointed out that both
permanent and rehabilitative alimony can be periodic. It inter-
preted Canakaris as having specified only that permanent alimony
terminates on remarriage and held that rehabilitative alimony
"should not necessarily be terminated upon remarriage,' 1 42 since
the purpose of rehabilitation does not disappear upon the recipi-
ent's remarriage. Then, in October 1980, the supreme court dis-
pelled whatever doubts may have existed about the nature of lump
sum alimony as a right vesting on final judgment and not terminat-
ing on remarriage. The issue in that case, Claughton v.
Claughton,1 43 was whether lump sum alimony payments to a wife
might continue after her remarriage. The supreme court stated
that remarriage would not prevent the use of lump sum alimony
"to provide the wife with an equitable share of the assets of-the
parties accumulated during their marriage, as distinguished from
her need for support."144 The court emphasized that the trial judge
must follow the standards of Canakaris and Brown, and that the
award must "be based on [the wife's] equitable share of the assets
resulting from her marital contribution rather than her need for
139. 386 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).
140. Id. at 597.
141. 385 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
142. Id. at 1389.
143. 393 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 1980).
144. Id. at 1062.
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support.""",
The open-ended language on alimony in Canakaris is not the
opinion's only deficiency. The case also failed to clarify whether
Florida is still a record title state for the purpose of distributing
marital assets or whether it has, by judicial fiat, adopted the con-
cept of equitable distribution. The equitable language of
Canakaris and the cases following it strongly support the latter
conclusion. Yet the law requires more clarification. Nowhere does
Canakaris specify what property is available for distribution; no-
where does it set forth what standards a trial court should employ
to assure equitable distribution. Because the Supreme Court of
Florida has frequently changed its treatment of property distribu-
tion in recent years, the district courts of appeal have not whole-
heartedly accepted the supreme court's apparent departure in
Canakaris from a pure record title system. The Florida Statutes
provide little guidance: Section 61.08 mentions only alimony, not
property distribution, and it does not provide any objective guide-
lines for determining the allocation of marital property. The
courts, stepping into this legislative void, are consequently using a
form of alimony (lump sum) as a substitute for legislation specifi-
cally concerned with property distribution. " 6 When courts employ
alimony for several different purposes, confusion and inconsisten-
cies are inevitable. Court-awarded lump sum alimony as a substi-
tute for legislation is simply not an acceptable permanent solution
for Florida. Florida needs a statute concerned specifically with the
distribution of marital property to lend consistency to marriage
dissolution law at the trial court level.
The trend in common law property states has been toward the
equitable distribution of property.1 47 Some states have achieved
this distribution by judicial fiat;14 8 others have passed property
distribution statutes that require supplementation by trial
courts.14 The Florida legislature should follow the precedents of
Illinois, New York, Colorado, or Maine, by adopting a form of the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.150 The Act defines marital
property and enumerates factors to guide courts in equitably dis-
145. Id.
146. 385 So. 2d at 1389.
147. I. BAXTER, supra note 7, at 99.
148. Id. at 98.
149. See Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 241 S.E. 2d 566 (1978); Painter v. Painter, 65
N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974).
150. 9A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. Section 307 of the Act concerns property distribution.
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tributing marital property. A property distribution statute, such as
that in Illinois," 1 allows courts to retain the discretion necessary
for case-by-case decisions, yet provides guidelines to assist courts
in determining what is equitable. 15' The statute serves to protect a
151. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40 § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980), provides:
(a) For purposes of this Act, 'marital property' means all property acquired
by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following, which is
known as 'non-marital property':
(1) property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage
or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) the increase in value of property acquired before the marriage; and
(6) property acquired before the marriage.
(b) All property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a
judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage is
presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held individually
or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in
common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property. The presumption of
marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a
method listed in subsection (a) of this Section.
(c) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of
marriage, or in a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of
marriage by a court which lacked jurisdiction to dispose of the property, the
court shall assign each spouse's non-marital property to that spouse. It also shall
divide the marital property without regard to marital misconduct in just propor-
tions considering all relevant factors, including:
(1) the contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preserva-
tion or depreciation or appreciation in value, of the marital and non-marital
property, including the contribution of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family
unit;
(2) the value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) the duration of the marriage;
(4) the relevant economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of
property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family
home, or the right to live therein for reasonable periods, to the spouse having
custody of the children;
(5) any obligations and rights arising from a prior marriage of either party;
(6) any antenuptial agreement of the parties;
(7) the age, health, station, occupation, amount and sources of income, voca-
tional skills, employability, estate, liabilities, and needs of each of the parties;
(8) the custodial provisions for any children;
(9) whether the apportionment is in lieu of or in addition to maintenance;
and
(10) the reasonable opportunity of each spouse for future acquisition of cap-
ital assets and income.
(d) The court may protect and promote the best interests of the children by
setting aside a portion of the jointly or separately held estates of the parties in a
separate fund or trust for the support, maintenance, education, and general wel-
fare of any minor, dependent, or incompetent child of the parties.
152. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski, 71 Ill. 2d 563, 376 N.E.2d 1382 (1978).
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dependent spouse by considering the homemaker's contributions
to the marriage. Property distribution need not be a function of
alimony; rather, alimony may merge with the concept of equitable
property distribution."'
Although Canakaris brought Florida closer to the tenets of the
majority of common law jurisdictions in the United States,1" the
legislature must act so that the Florida courts' distribution of
property upon divorce will reflect a consistency that is truly
equitable.
153. Id.
154. I. BAXTER, supra note 7, at 98.
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